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ABSTRACT 
 
Nowadays, railway transportation becomes a popular choice among commuter as 
transportation mode to travel from one place to another. Thus, it makes the industry 
grows faster especially at urban area. The complexity of rail network required high 
level of safety features to prevent any interruption. For that purpose, this thesis will 
show a proper procedure on how the prediction model of accident need to be 
conducted using regression model. From the root cause analysis, the most contributory 
factor to influence the accident can be identified. “Ishikawa diagram” is a popular tool 
to identify problem occurring from the root where it begins. Process of identifying 
required bundles of accident and incident investigation report at least for 5 years and 
this thesis used data starting from 1999 to 2014. It was taken from several sources on 
Australian Railways website. Analysis from Ishikawa shows there are ten main factors 
involved to influences an accident. Those factors are “train driver mistake”, “other’s 
human mistake”, “weather influence”, “track problem”, “train problem”, “signaling 
error”, “maintenance error”, “communication error”, “procedure error”, and “others”. 
Each factor with positive correlation coefficient value to the type of accident and 
incident were taken as parameter. Then, before completing the prediction model 
formula, some of hypothesis needs to be tested to know which model among 
regression model is suitable and give a better prediction result. Dispersion test is a test 
to calculate dispersion value to know either data is under dispersion for value less than 
1 (Poisson model is appropriate) or over dispersion for value more than 1 (Negative 
binomial is appropriate). Then, Vuong test is applied to measure which model has a 
better result between those two models. From the hypothesis, this thesis shows that 
Zero-inflated model is the most fitted model to predict accident and incident cases of 
collision, derailment and SPAD. In some country, they may have different system of 
rail and geography, thus it should have different possibilities to influence accident and 
incident. However, this method and procedure are available to use for them to identify 
and predict the most influencing factor that contributes to the accident occurrences. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Project background   
 
Rail transportation is one of the largest transportation modes in the world. This 
transportation was very popular among developed country. It also has multi-purpose 
function. Early of their invention, rail transportation was use to bring coal, ore and 
others industrial goods to the warehouse and port. As time advanced, these modes 
have evolved from hand power to the horse power, then improve to steam engine, 
diesel engine, and nowadays are electrified system. Rail system is not only to bring 
goods, but also as transportation mode to move people to their destiny. This mode is 
also the best solution for public transport especially at urban area because of their 
advantages. By commuting with rail service, consumer is able to manage their time 
journey, reducing transportation cost, able to avoids traffic jam, save time, reduce the 
environment pollution, and many more. Besides that, this rail system also can move 
in large number of passengers per trip, especially in big city and urban areas. All the 
advantages and higher demands make a lot of effort by researcher and among rail 
manufacturer such as Bombardier (Canada), Alstom (France), and Siemens 
(Germany) to compete each other’s to advancing their technologies. Thus, 
governments spend billion dollar of money to invest in these technologies. Urban light 
rail systems and subways are expanding in many regions of the world, and there is 
growing investment in intercity high-speed rail lines[1]. 
 Rapidity of rail system makes it more complicated and complex. A lot of 
safety devices were introduced to improve previous system. There is not only focus 
on signaling system and equipment such as interlocking and block signal, but also to 
the boogie system, infrastructure and many more by the manufacturer. All the element 
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 of rail must be in good condition and well function to avoid any possibilities of 
accident occur. In that case, risk assessment is important in initial planning to improve 
rail network in terms of safety for the future. Thus, periodical statistical data is 
required to monitor performance and efficiency of rail services. Rail accident and 
incident is a major factor that will cause interruption to the rail operation. For that, 
more research that focused on this issue is needed. Such as in the United States, the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) periodically reviews quality issues and 
adjusts its programs and processes to ensure continuous quality improvement at rail 
road crossing. They require each state to develop and implement a highway safety-
improvement program (HSIP), which consists of three components. Those are 
planning, implementation, and evaluation [2]. 
However, preventing action is not only at rail road areas, periodical surveying 
or monitoring to the others section also important to prevent any accident occur such 
as rail road structure, geometry and surrounding condition, maintaining program, 
working environment and so on. All of this must be planned properly to ensure entire 
system in good condition without any disturbances. Especially at rural area, lower 
slopes of hill, bridges, tunnel area, and also at the middle of jungle. Thus, continues 
effort to increase safety level at all aspect is required to ensure zero cases in the future. 
Prevention action is not to prevent human soul and injury only, but this program also 
important to prevent any loses to the facilities such as train and track.  
By doing deep analysis, root cause leading to the accident and incident events 
can be detected. Furthermore, effectiveness of counter measure had been taken before 
it can be evaluated. Thus, further effort can be done properly to improve safety 
performance and eliminate error occurrence from beginning. By using mathematical 
modeling approach, correlation and coefficient value of each factor can be calculated. 
Prediction model is used to improve monitoring system of railway network to 
overcome any danger and possibilities of train accident in the future. Further 
information of prediction model use in railway is discussed on chapter 2. Other than 
that, statistical data will help management to maintain and monitor the safety 
performance of the rail track network. Furthermore, special program to motivate 
employee can be arranged to ensure they always in good condition either physical or 
mental during on job. Thus, Incident cases cause by human can be neglected. In terms 
of tangible benefit, they can prevent their loss of profit towards restructuring the 
disaster area caused by an accident. 
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1.2 Problem statement 
 
Risk assessment related to the rail industries had been done since 1941. Until now, 
the assessment only focused on collision at rail road crossing with warning devices 
and track features as a subject or parameter. However, it is less researched at the other 
area. Accident or incident can be happen at anywhere with various conditions. 
Accident and incident could be happening, which might be led by device failure, 
procedural mistake, or any interruption. Furthermore, others accident or incident 
categories such as derailment and signal pass at danger also can give possibilities to 
the loss of human soul or injury. Since every country has a different geographic and 
operating system of rail in their networks, prediction model could be difficult to be 
fixed for their independent variable or factor influence. Because of that, there is no 
proper investigative procedure to predict the rail accident and incident. 
Thus, this paper will focus on method how to clarify the most influence factor 
will affect to the accident or incident event and become independent variable for 
prediction model. It is combination between root cause analysis to find the 
contributory factor and prediction model as a predictor. Thus, priority of each factor 
can be found. Since, there are a lot of model for regression, this procedure also to 
identify which model is most suitable to use after go through certain steps and 
hypothesis test. Then, this method can be standardizing in rail industry everywhere. 
 
1.3 Objective   
 
1. To develop investigative procedure to predict factor influence of railway accident. 
2. To identify contributory factor that influencing to the rail accident using Ishikawa 
diagram through case study of railway accident investigation report. 
3. To formulate the prediction model of railway accident and incident using 
regression formula. 
1.4 Scope of study 
 
 4 
 This thesis focuses on case study of railway accident investigation report had been 
officially announce and publish for public reviews. The purpose of case study is to 
investigate the factor that causing those accident occurring without blaming any 
parties. The case study report use in this thesis was started from 2009 to 2014. There 
were several official government webpages in Australia was use as reference to catch 
the data. This selection was made because in some country, this information is 
prohibited and confidential. Then, the data extracted will be categories to put in 
Ishikawa diagram to find the root cause. For that, concept of Ishikawa diagram must 
be understood. The main factor taken from Ishikawa and statistical data from case 
study was use to predict the most influence factor causes by using regression formula. 
To simulate regression formula, R-studio software was used to find the correlation 
value and coefficient value. Before that, it must follow certain process and hypotheses 
test. Further detail methodology was discussed on Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERITURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Rail accident and incident terminologies 
 
Referring to the “Federal Railroad Administrative Office of Safety Analysis (FRA)”, 
they use term of "Accident/Incident" to describe the entire list of reportable events. 
These include collisions, derailments, and other events involving the operation of on-
track equipment and causing reportable damage above an established threshold, 
impacts between railroad on-track equipment and highway users at crossings, and all 
other incidents or exposures that cause a fatality or injury to any person, or an 
occupational illness to a railroad employee. These terminologies are divided into three 
major groups for reporting purposes[3]. 
1. Train accidents 
A safety-related event involving on-track rail equipment (both standing and 
moving), causing monetary damage to the rail equipment and track above a 
prescribed amount 
2. Highway-rail grade crossing incidents. 
Any impact between a rail and highway user (both motor vehicles and other 
users of the crossing as a designated crossing site, including walkways, 
sidewalks, etc., associated with the crossing 
3. Other incidents. 
Any death, injury, or occupational illness of a railroad employee that is not the 
result of a "train accident' or "highway-rail incident". 
 
However, “New Zealand Railways Act 2005” define accident as an occurrence 
associated with the operation of a rail vehicle or the use of railway infrastructure or 
railway premises that causes such as the death or serious injury to individuals, or 
 6 
 significant damage to property. While Incident means an occurrence other than an 
accident that is associated with the operation of a rail vehicle or the use of railway 
infrastructure or railway premises that placed or could have placed such as a person 
at risk of death or serious injury or property at risk of serious damage[4].  
 
2.2 Accident identification analysis 
 
Managing risk assessment is one of the ways to improve safety of railway by 
identifying or predicting the derailment. Zarembski [5] in their research had focused 
on risk assessment of broken rail, rail buckling and vehicle track geometry. By 
implementing all risk assessment model to this element in Europe and US country, it 
showed a positive impact to the reduction of failure/defect about 28% - 33% for 
broken rail and 30% - 50% reduction of rail buckling[5]. Continues effort of this 
activities to identify and prediction of hazardous is needed to ensure this positive 
impact will increase and minimize the possibilities of an accident from happening 
again.  
Several researcher in their study [6][7][8] has mention for the possible causes 
of transit accidents usually happen in previous event has summarize in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: List of major transit accident types and possible causes 
 
Type Possible causes 
Fire 
failure of electrical equipment, brakes operation, storage of inflammable 
material, derailing, the strike of lightening 
Flood Poor design or failure of the drainage system 
Collisions 
1. Violation of stop signs by the driver (intrusion) 
2. Failure of the ATC system 
3. Signal errors (warning devices) 
4. Breakdown or mishandling of the split switch 
5. Train speed 
6. Number of train operation and vehicle (ADT)  
Derailment 
1. Incomplete release of hand brake 
2. Inadequate geometric design 
3. Excessive rocking of the trains 
4. Speeding at the turn 
5. Damage of the bearing and wheel 
6. Main operation 
7. Train handling 
8. Track geometry 
9. Buckled track 
 10. Main line break operation 
Door Accident Jammed by the door or the uncontrolled opening of the door 
Breakdowns of 
power supply 
system 
Failure of the power supply or emergency power supply facilities, overload, 
mishandling, or struck by lightening 
Intrusion 
Animals or people could be found intruding the track on the level ground or 
the station 
Gap fall Inadequate design of the platform or station 
Scraped by the 
train 
Mindless passenger or lack of proper signs on the platform Natural 
Natural Disaster Earthquakes, lightening, storms, or heat waves 
Others Criminal Acts, suicide, crowding, etc. 
 
This accident and incident possibly can be categories in three main elements or 
categories and it would be considered as contribution factor to the hazards of railway 
accident [6]. Those are:  
1. Human: operators and passengers 
2. System: material, equipment, tools, and safety facility 
3. Environment: temperature, humidity, ventilation, lights, and noises 
(natural environment and artificial environment) in the working place. 
 
Inter relation between entire elements also make the possibilities become huge to 
influencing the accident. For that, deep analysis when the accidents happen is required 
to find out the root cause.  
According to Vorley [9], Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a method that is used 
to address a problem or non-conformance, in order to get to the “root cause” of the 
problem. It is used so we can correct or eliminate the cause, and prevent the problem 
from recurring. While Mahto & kumar [10] mention Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is 
the process of identifying causal factors using a structured approach with techniques 
designed to provide a focus for identifying and resolving problems. The most popular 
tools usually used in RCA are Ishikawa diagram or fishbone charts to measure cause-
effect relationship of how these factors lead to hazards. Below Figure 2.1 show a basic 
diagram for Ishikawa diagram tool[9]. 
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Figure 2.1: Basic diagram of Ishikawa diagram or fish bone[9]  
 
The others tool is Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Failure modes and 
effects analysis (FMEA) is an evaluation technique used to identify and eliminate 
known and/or potential failures, problems, and errors from a system, design, process, 
and/or service before they actually occur. FMEA is to prevent errors by attempting to 
identify all the ways a process could fail, estimate the probability and consequences 
of each failure, and then take action to prevent the potential failures from occurring. 
According to the Hugest [10], Root cause analysis (RCA) used extensively in 
engineering and similar to critical incident technique is a formalized investigation and 
problem-solving approach focused on identifying and understanding the underlying 
causes of an event as well as potential events that were intercepted.  RCA is a 
technique used to identify trends and assess risk that can be used whenever human 
error is suspected with the understanding that system, rather than individual factors, 
are likely the root cause of most problems. A similar procedure is critical incident 
technique, where after an event occurs, information is collected on the causes and 
actions that led to the event. 
According to Wang [6] in their study found that there are two stages to identify 
the accident that show in Figure 2.2. At the first stages, all the element factors would 
cause the system unsafe conditions, while they might not affect the normal operation 
immediately. Under such a situation, the specific unsafe conditions or behaviors can 
 8 
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 trace back and identify the inherent hazards. In this case, most of the hazards can be 
eliminated under a perfect management system, for example: an accurate routine 
check system, the alertness of the operators, a good auditing system, and a strict 
quality and safety control system. Necessary defenses or barriers are the last shift use 
to keep the unsafe situations from adverse consequences. If the unsafe situations keep 
on remaining in the system, the barriers themselves are identified as the source of 
direct hazards in the second stage. When the potential hazards are not eliminated in 
the first stage, the automatic train operation control and monitoring system will come 
into play. The Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) and Automatic Train Protection 
(ATP) should detect any abnormalities in the system and send the messages to the 
control center for correction or to the driver to pull on the emergency brake. Once the 
unsafe conditions keep on exposing, the hazards in the second stage will be identified 
by the factors that the automatic train control and monitoring system fail to respond 
with safety measures and stop the exposure of hazardous elements. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Two-stage analysis for the identification of hazards in the rail rapid 
transit  [6] 
 
 
2.3 Prediction formula as modeling approach 
 
Since early 1900’s, Rail network has growing up in number and territory to connecting 
entire nation especially in Europe, United States, India, and others country as a main 
transportation to carrying people and things. Interruption to the rail track which has 
10 
 own right of way will cause disaster. In United States, the exposure to potential 
collisions between trains and motor vehicles at some 224,000 railroad-highway grade 
crossings has created a serious problem with regard to the convenience and safety of 
highway travel [11]. For that, many activities had been done to improve safety in order 
reducing an accident especially in number of death. Thus, as an effort for that, some 
devices has installed to the railroad-highway area as a signal or warning to make 
people alert the situation where the train will be crossing that area. It is not only for 
human, but it also for the system that controlling the crossing area as a system 
protection such as flash light and short arm gates with flash light. Since 1941, Peabody 
and Dimmick start to study the potential of hazard as an approach to reducing the 
number of accident and until now currently this effort has continues to be study.  
 
2.3.1 Peabody and Dimmick formula 
 
L. E. Peabody and T. P. Dimmick, in a 1941 study performed by the Division of 
Transport, Public Roads Administration, collected data on 3,563 crossings in 23 states 
for a five-year study period. The prediction of accident frequency is useful both in the 
determination of crossing warrants and for the economic justification of crossing 
protection. The prediction equation proposed by Peabody and Dimmick is as 
follows:[12] 
𝑃 =
1
𝑁
∑
(𝐻)(𝑇)
100𝐴
=
1
100𝑁
∑
(𝐻)(𝑇)
𝐴
       (2.1) 
 
Where; 
P  = the protection coefficient for a type of protection 
N  = the number of crossings in a type group 
H  = the daily highway traffic volume at each crossing 
T  = daily train traffic volume at each crossing,  
A  = number of accidents.  
 
 
 
 A correlation analysis was used to develop the following equation:[11] 
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 𝐼 = 1.28
(𝐻0.170)(𝑇0.151)
𝑃0.171
+ 𝐾       (2.2) 
 
2.3.2 The New Hampshire index formula 
 
 
After the Peabody-Dimmick formula was published, a number of cities and states 
developed their own hazard index formulas and methods for use in ranking railroad 
crossings for safety improvements (Referring to the APPENDIX A1-A3 & B for more 
detail) [13]. The study [14] has mention that the New Hampshire formula to be the 
optimum formula to use as a start towards developing a railroad crossing safety 
improvement program. New Hampshire formula is the most straightforward and uses 
three readily available inputs. The New Hampshire Index is a very simple hazard 
index calculation that can give a high level ranking to determine the need and relative 
priority of railroad crossings for safety improvements. Based on this formula, railroad 
crossings with higher exposure factors and/or passive warning devices will rank as a 
higher priority for safety improvements than will railroad crossings with lower 
exposure factors and/or more active levels of warning devices. The New Hampshire 
Index formula is:  
𝐻𝐼 =  (𝑉)(𝑇)(𝑃𝑓)         (2.3) 
Where; 
HI = hazard index 
V  = AADT volume 
T = average daily train traffic volume 
𝑃𝑓 = protection factor (0.1 for gates, 0.6 for flashing lights, and 1.0 for signs only) 
 
Austin[15] in their report has mentioned that several states have developed their own 
variations of the New Hampshire Index with utilizing the basic equation with 
modifications to allow incorporation of other accident causative factors. 
Variations of the New Hampshire Index follow: 
Variation 1: 𝐻𝐼 = (𝑉)(2𝑇𝑓)(𝑇𝑠)
(𝑆𝐷+𝐴𝑁+𝑁𝑇𝑅)
4
    (2.4)  
 
Variation 2: 𝐻𝐼 =
(𝑉)(𝑇)(𝐴5)
𝑃𝑓
      (2.5)  
12 
  
Variation 3: 𝐻𝐼 = (𝑉)(𝑇)
(𝑇𝑇)+𝑇𝑇𝑅+𝑆𝐷+𝐴𝑁+𝐴𝐿+𝐿+𝐺+𝑉𝑆𝐷+𝑊+𝐿𝐼)
100
  (2.6) 
 
Variation 4: 𝐻𝐼 =
(𝑃𝑓)(𝑉𝑓)(𝑇)(𝑇𝑆)(𝑁𝑇𝑅)
160
+ (70𝐴𝑎)
2 + 1.2(𝑆𝐷)  (2.7) 
 
𝐴𝑎 = (𝑉 +
𝑆𝐵𝑃
1.2
) (𝐻𝑀)      (2.8) 
 
Variation 5: 𝐻𝐼 = 0.1(𝑃𝑓)(𝐴𝑓)(𝑇1) + (𝐴𝑁)(𝑁𝑇𝑅)(𝑆)(0.5𝐿) + 
𝑇𝑆((𝐹𝐶)(𝑃) + (
(𝑉)(𝑇)
10000
) + 𝑆𝐵)    (2.9) 
 
Variation 6: 𝐻𝐼 =
(𝑉𝑓)(𝑃𝑓)(𝑇)
(𝑇𝑅+𝑇𝑁+𝑇𝑓+𝐻𝑆+𝐺+𝑆𝐷+𝐴𝑁)
    (2.10) 
 
Variation 7: 𝐻𝐼 = 0.1(𝑉)(𝑇) + 0.1(𝐻𝑆)(𝑇𝑆) + 
(𝑆𝐷)(𝐴𝑁)(𝑇𝑅)(𝑁𝑇𝑅)(𝐴𝐿) + (𝐴𝑎
2 + 1)(𝑅𝐹)(𝐿𝑃)(𝑃𝑓) +
(𝑆𝐵)(𝑆𝐵𝑃) + 10(𝐻𝑀     (2.11) 
 
Variation 8: 𝐻𝐼 =
(𝑇)√(𝑉)
𝑃𝑓
       (2.12) 
 
 
𝐴𝑠 = number of accidents in five years  
𝐴𝑎= number of accidents per year  
𝐴𝑓 = accident factor  
AL = highway alignment factor  
AN = approach angle factor  
FC = functional class factor  
G = approach grades factor  
HI = hazard index 
S = surface type factor  
SB = number of school buses  
SBP=Uumber of school bus passengers 
SD = sight distance factor  
T = average number of trains per day  
𝑇𝑓 = number of fast trains  
TN = number of night trains factor  
TR = number and type of tracks factor 
HM = hazardous material vehicles factor 
TS = train speeds factor 
HS = highway speed factor  
L = number of lanes factor  
LI = local interference factor  
LP = local priority factor  
NTR = number of tracks factor  
P = population factor 
𝑃𝑓 = protection factor 
𝑇𝑠 = number of slow trains  
TT = type of train movements factor  
TTR = type of tracks factor  
V = annual average daily traffic  
𝑉𝑓 = annual average daily traffic factor  
VSD = vertical sight distance factor  
W = crossing width factor 
RF = rideability factor 
13 
 The dissimilarity between the New Hampshire Index model variations raises 
concerns over its validity. While most of the discrepancies can be attributed to state 
preferences, concern is raised due to the lack of consistency. Depending on the 
variation chosen, prediction values vary considerably. 
 
2.3.3 The NCHRP hazard index formula 
 
The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Hazard Index, 
documented in NCHRP Report 50, was published in 1964 in a joint effort between the 
American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO now AASHTO) and the 
Association of American Railroads (AAR) in response to the disproportionately high 
number of accidents occurring at highway-rail crossings. The NCHRP Hazard Index 
used accident data that spanned five years and was collected by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, state agencies and others[15]. 
The NCHRP Hazard Index closely resembles the basic formula of the New 
Hampshire Index described above: 
𝐸𝐴 =  (𝐴)(𝐵)(𝐶𝑇𝐷)        (2.13) 
Where; 
EA = expected crash frequency  
A   = vehicles per day factor (refer Table 2.2) 
B   = protection factor indicative of warning devices present (refer Table 2.3) 
CTD = current trains per day 
 
Table 2.2: Vehicles per Day Factor (NCHRP Hazard Index)[15]  
 
Vehicle per day A Vehicle per day A Vehicle per day A 
250 0.000347 6000 0.007720 16000 0.019549 
500 0.000694 7000 0.009005 18000 0.021736 
1000 0.001377 8000 0.010278 20000 0.023877 
2000 0.002627 9000 0.011435 25000 0.029051 
3000 0.003981 10000 0.012674 30000 0.034757 
4000 0.005208 12000 0.015012   
5000 0.006516 14000 0.017315   
  
Table 2.3: Existing Devices Factor (NCHRP Hazard Index) [15]  
Existing Devices B 
A Cross bucks, highway volume less than 500 per day 3.89 
B Cross bucks, urban 3.06 
C Cross bucks, rural 3.08 
D Stop signs, highways volume less than 500 per day 4.51 
E Stop signs 1.15 
F Wigwags 0.61 
G Flashing lights, urban 0.23 
H Flashing lights, rural 0.93 
I Gates, urban 0.08 
J Gates, rural 0.19 
 
The NCHKP Hazard Index is concise and easy to use. Unfortunately, this is 
both its virtue and its vice. There are only three variables to calculate which makes it 
easy to use, but this limits its descriptive capabilities.  
 
2.3.4 USDOT Accident Prediction Formula 
 
The USDOT Accident Prediction Formula, developed in the early 1980’s, is most 
widely used. This complex and comprehensive formula comprises three primary 
equations:[15] 
𝑎 = (𝐾)(𝐸𝐼)(𝐷𝑇)(𝑀𝑆)(𝑀𝑇)(𝐻𝑃)(𝐻𝐿)(𝐻𝑇)     (2.14)  
The factors in Equation 14 each represent characteristics of crossings in the 
Rail-Highway Crossing Inventory (see Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6). These factors were 
found to be statistically significant, using nonlinear multiple regression, in the 
prediction of accidents at highway-rail crossings. Factors such as sight distance are 
unavailable in the Rail-Highway Crossing Inventory. Using Table 2.4, the value 
calculated represents the factor’s influence in the prediction of accidents at highway-
rail crossings where: 
c  = number of highway vehicles per day  
t  = number of trains per day  
mt  = number of main tracks  
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 d  = number of through trains per day during daylight  
hp = highway payed (yes = I and no = 2.0)  
ms  = maximum timetable speed in mph  
hi  = number of highway lanes  
ht = highway type factor (see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 below) 
Table 2.4: Variables for Equation 2.14 (USDOT Accident Prediction Model)[15] 
 
Variable Description 
Coefficient or Relationship Variable 
Passive Control Flashing Lights Gates 
K Formula Constant 0.002268 0.003646 0.001088 
EI 
Exposure Index 
Factor 
(
ct + 0.2
0.2
)0.03334 (
ct + 0.2
0.2
)0.2953 (
ct + 0.2
0.2
)0.3116 
DT 
Day Through Trains 
Factor 
(
d + 0.2
0.2
)0.1336 (
d + 0.2
0.2
)0.2953 1.0 
MS 
Maximum Speed 
Factor 
𝑒0.0077ms  1.0 1.0 
MT 
Highway Paved 
Factor 
𝑒0.2094mt  𝑒0.1088mt  𝑒0.2912mt  
HP 
Highway Paved 
Factor 
𝑒−0.6160(hp−1)  1.0 1.0 
HL 
Highway Lanes 
Factor 
1.0 𝑒0.1380(hl−1)  𝑒0.1036(hl−1)  
HT 
Highway Type 
Factor 
𝑒−0.1000(ht−1)  1.0 1.0 
 
Table 2.5: Rural Highway Type Values (USDOT Accident Prediction Model)[15] 
 
Highway Type: Rural Highway Type Factor (ht) 
Interstate 1 
Other principal arterial 2 
Minor arterial 3 
Major collector 4 
Minor collector 5 
Local 6 
Table 2.6: Urban Highway Type Values (USDOT Accident Prediction Model)[15]  
Highway Type: Urban Highway Type Factor (ht) 
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 Interstate 1 
Other freeway/expressway 2 
Other principal arterial 3 
Minor arterial 4 
Collector 5 
Local 6 
 
𝐵 =
𝑇𝑜
𝑇𝑜+𝑇
(𝑎) =
𝑇𝑜
𝑇𝑜+𝑇
(
𝑁
𝑇
)        (2.15) 
Equation 2.15 adjusts the accident prediction value a, from Equation 2.14 to reflect 
the actual accident history at the crossing. The variable, N, is the number of observed 
accidents in T years at the crossing, and 𝑇0 is the formula weighting factor defined as: 
𝑇𝑜 =
1.0
(0.05+𝑎)
         (2.16)  
𝐴 = (𝑘)(𝐵)         (2.17) 
Where;  
A = final crash prediction in crashes per year at the railroad crossing 
k = normalizing constant (recalculated every two years for passive devices, 
active devices, and gates) 
B = second crash prediction from Equation 2.15 
The US DOT formula also includes calculations that determine the probability of 
a railroad crossing crash being an injury crash or a fatal crash. Every two years, the 
US DOT recalculates the formula constants based on the most recent five years of 
crash data. Crash severity is determined by the following equations:[14] 
I. The US DOT Crash Severity Equation for Fatal Crashes 
𝑃(𝐹𝐴|𝐴) = 1/(1 + (KF)(MS)(TT)(TS)(UR))    (2.18) 
Where; 
P(FA|A) = probability of a fatal crash, given a crash  
KF  = formula constant (440.9) 
MS = factor for maximum timetable train speed = ms−0.9981   
TT  = factor for through trains per day = (tt + 1)−0.0872  
TS  = factor for switch trains per day = (ts + 1)0.0872 
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 UR  = factor for urban or rural crossing = 𝑒0.3571ur   
ur = 1 for urban, 0 for rural 
 
II. The US DOT Crash Severity Equation for Casualty Crashes. 
𝑃(𝐶𝐴|𝐴) =  1/(1 + (KC)(MS)(TK)(UR))      (2.19) 
Where;  
P(CA|A) = probability of a casualty crash, given a crash  
KC  = formula constant (4.481) 
MS = factor for maximum timetable train speed = ms−0.343    
TK  = factor for number of tracks = 𝑒0.1153tk 
U  = factor for urban or rural crossing = 𝑒0.296ur    
ur = 1 for urban, 0 for rural 
 
2.4 Regression technique 
 
The number of cars derailed represents non-negative count data, whose mean value 
can be estimated using regression techniques. Poisson regression and negative 
binomial (NB) regression are among the most popular count data regression methods 
used in accident analysis. The Poisson model is suitable for data whose mean is equal 
to its variance, whereas the NB model assumes that the Poisson mean follows a 
gamma distribution. The NB model has been used for analyzing over-dispersed data 
(the variance is greater than mean)[16]. 
 
2.4.1  Poisson regression model 
 
In light of the problems associated with linear regression, many turned to Poisson 
regression as a means to better predict accident frequency: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖) =
𝑒(−𝜆𝑖)(𝜆𝑖
𝑦𝑖)
𝑦𝑖!
        (2.20)  
 Where 𝑃(𝑦𝑖) for this investigation is the probability of 0, 1, 2, 3…n accidents 
occurring at the track section 𝑖, 𝑦𝑖 expected number (0, 1, 2, 3…n) of accidents 
occurring at track section 𝑖, and 𝜆𝑖 is the Poisson parameter defined as: 
𝜆𝑖 = 𝑒
(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1+𝛽2𝑥2+𝛽3𝑥3+…….+𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘)      (2.21) 
Or more commonly in log-linear form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜆𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝛽3𝑥3+ … … . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘    (2.22) 
Because the Poisson regression model is heteroscedastic, the model 
coefficients for are typically estimated via maximum likelihood methods. The 
likelihood function for the Poisson regression model is given as:[17] 
𝐿(𝛽) = ∏
𝑒[−𝑒(𝛽𝑋𝑖)][𝑒(𝛽𝑋𝑖)]
𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖!
𝑖         (2.23) 
One important property of the Poisson distribution is that it restricts the mean and 
variance of the distribution to be equal: 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑌𝑖]        (2.24) 
If this equality does not hold, the data are said to be either under dispersed or over 
dispersed [18]. Same situation had been discussed by other researchers in their report 
[19]. 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖] > 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑌𝑖] Under dispersed     (2.25) 
𝐸[𝑌𝑖] < 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑌𝑖] Over dispersed     (2.26) 
 
2.4.2  Negative binomial regression model 
 
Due to common over-dispersion difficulties, use of negative binomial regression 
techniques was the next evolutionary step in relating accident frequency to various 
explanatory variables. According to Austin & Carson [18] study, the negative 
binomial model is more appropriate for over-dispersed data because the model relaxes 
the constraint of equal mean and variance(𝐸[𝑌𝑖] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑌𝑖]). This relaxation of the 
18 
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 Poisson constraint is accomplished through the addition of a Gamma-distributed error 
term to the Poisson model such that 
𝜆𝑖 = 𝑒
(𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1+𝛽2𝑥2+𝛽3𝑥3+…….+𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘+𝜉)     (2.27) 
Or in log-linear form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜆𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝛽3𝑥3+ … … . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝜉   (2.28) 
Where ξ is the Gamma-distributed error term and all other variables are as earlier 
defined. The addition of ξ either allows the mean to differ from the variance such that 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑌𝑖] = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖][1 + 𝛼𝐸[𝑌𝑖]]       (2.29) 
Where α is an additional estimable parameter indicative of over-dispersion. If α is not 
significantly different from zero, the data are not over-dispersed and the Poisson 
regression is appropriate. The larger the value of α, the more variability there is in the 
data over and above that associated with the mean 𝜆𝑖.[17]. Lord & Mannering [20] in 
their study has mentioned the limitation of Negative Binomial to handle data with 
small sample size and low sample means value.  
 
2.4.3  Zero-truncated model 
 
 Both the Poisson and NB distributions include zeros, so they cannot be directly use 
to analyze data excluding zero counts, such as the train derailment severity data. The 
smallest number of cars derailed in a derailment is 1. The Poisson or NB probability 
functions and their respective log-likelihood functions need to be modified to account 
for the exclusion of zeros. Compared to the traditional count data models (Poisson or 
negative binomial), the zero-truncated models calculate the probability of response 
variable based on positive count data using Bayes’s Theorem. The comparison of a 
ZTNB and NB model shows that the ZTNB model accounts for the exclusion of zeros, 
thus may have a greater probability and mean value of the response variable, given all 
else being equal. Below is an equation for ZTNB.  
Probability mass function:  
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 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖|𝑌𝑖 > 0) =
(
Γ(𝑦𝑖+𝛼
−1)
𝑦𝑖!Γ(𝛼
−1)
)(
𝛼−1
𝛼−1+𝜇𝑖
)
𝛼−1
(
𝜇𝑖
𝛼−1+𝜇𝑖
)𝑦𝑖
1−(1+𝛼𝜇𝑖)
−𝛼−1
    (2.30) 
Mean; 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑌𝑖 > 0) =
𝜇𝑖
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖>0)
=
𝜇𝑖
1−(1+𝛼𝜇𝑖)
−𝛼−1
     (2.31) 
Variance;  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑖|𝑌𝑖 > 0) =
𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑌𝑖 > 0)
𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖>0)
𝛼 = [1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖 = 0)
1+𝛼𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑌𝑖 > 0)  (2.32)  
Likelihood function; 
 
𝐿 = ∏ 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖|𝑌𝑖 > 0)
𝑁
𝑖=1        (2.33) 
= ∏
(
𝛤(𝑦𝑖+𝛼
−1)
𝑦𝑖!𝛤(𝛼
−1)
)(
𝛼−1
𝛼−1+𝜇𝑖
)
𝛼−1
(
𝜇𝑖
𝛼−1+𝜇𝑖
)𝑦𝑖
1−(1+𝛼𝜇𝑖)
−𝛼−1
𝑁
𝑖=1       (2.34) 
Where 𝑃𝑟(𝑌𝑖|𝑌𝑖 > 0) is the probability mass function of zero- truncated negative 
binomial distribution, 𝐸(𝑌𝑖|𝑌𝑖 > 0) is the expectation of zero-truncated negative 
binomial distribution, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑖|𝑌𝑖 > 0) is the variance of zero-truncated negative 
binomial distribution, 𝛼 is the over-dispersion parameter, 𝐿 is the likelihood function, 
𝜇𝑖 is the estimated derailment severity for the 𝑖th observation, 𝑌𝑖 is the observed 
derailment severity for the 𝑖th observation.[16] 
 
 
2.4.4  Parameter use in modeling approach 
 
Some of researches [19][21][22] has mention in their research about the parameter 
required in data analysis to develop prediction model such as below:  
I. railway feature: daily trains, train speed, and track number; 
II. Highway feature: highway type, highway width, highway grade, highway 
lanes, highway separation, annual averaged daily traffic, and daily trucks 
 III. Crossing feature: crossing type, crossing width, crossing length, crossing 
angle, crossing surface, obstacle detection device, warning bell and flashing 
light, emergence call, and trolley wire; 
IV. Traffic controls: stop line markings, police patrol, and law enforcement 
camera; 
V. Geographic: crash location can be separated by region 
VI. Environmental: Lighting and weather condition 
All the parameter chosen will be use as independent variable to the prediction model 
analysis. Usually, this parameter has relation or can be possible causes to the 
accident and incident. Thus, prediction model is use to evaluate performance of the 
parameter chosen either good or bad. 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
This literature reviews have discussed several perspectives to predict an accident and 
incident in railway. In this industry, terminologies of accident and incident is used to 
refer the whole occurrence happen causing damage of properties, facilities or anything 
causing human death or injured, or in risk of death or injured.  The reviews also have 
discussed about root cause analysis. This method is importance to use to find out the 
root cause of problem occur. One of the methods used is Ishikawa diagram. Ishikawa 
diagram is quality improvement tools to find out the cause effect of problem occurred. 
There are three elements induced in rail accident, those are human, environment and 
system. Then, all the possibility of accident can be identify using this tool. Literature 
review also discuss on previous prediction model used around the world. It starts with 
Peabody and Dimmick formula in 1941 to predict rail crossing accident frequency. 
After that, the New Hampshire formula was introduced and become the most optimum 
formula. This formula is more straightforward with three readily available inputs. 
Based on this formula, railroad crossings with higher exposure factors or passive 
warning devices will rank as a higher priority for safety improvements than will 
railroad crossings with lower exposure factors or more active levels of warning 
devices. American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO now AASHTO) 
and the Association of American Railroads (AAR) in response to the 
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 disproportionately high number of accidents occurring at highway-rail crossings has 
introduce NCHRP Hazard index. This model closely resembles the basic formula of 
the New Hampshire Index. The others popular prediction model used are USDOT 
formula in 1980. However, this formula is quite complex compare to the others. 
Nowadays, most of researcher use regression formula as a method to predict rail 
accident referring to their characteristic of count data. The Poisson model is suitable 
for data whose mean is equal to its variance (under dispersion data), while Negative 
binomial for mean is less than variance (over dispersion data). Furthermore, when the 
data is excess zero, inflated model is more proper to use. However, when the data are 
non-negative value, truncated model is more suitable to use. Other than that, this 
reviews also focusing on what are the parameters used and need to be considered to 
predict accident or incident model to completing this thesis from previous prediction 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter, it will briefly discuss on methodology process of prediction 
assessment. There are several step required before start doing the prediction. Thus, 
flow process in Figure 3.1 will explain why this assessment is required and important 
to the railway industry. From that Figure 3.1, it is necessary to conduct some 
investigation when train incident occurred. However, it is depending on impact from 
that occurrence. Most of that, the investigation is appeared when it relates to the safety 
impact or it cause huge damage to the rail system and infrastructure. Thus, counter 
measure is required to fixing the broken area. Sometimes, upgrading system is needed 
to improve current system and overcome the problem from repeated. However, the 
common problem they are facing is a cost limitation. Thus, to ensure the counter 
measure is effective and applicable with the cost, each contributory factor should have 
their own priority level. Then comprehensive plan can be set to eliminate those factor 
one by one. Thus, to realizing it, prediction model was proposed. This prediction 
model assessment focuses to find the most contributory factor of accident occurrence 
and prioritizing it. Prediction model also can be use as monitoring system of accident 
and incident cases. In future, it could help to improve safety feature and reducing 
number of accident cases in railway. 
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Figure 3.1: Flow of research 
 
In below Figure 3.2, it shows the flowchart of extracting data to analyze the 
accident and incident data cases getting from investigation report. Then develop 
prediction equation model using regression formula. This process flow was created to 
matching the data taken with software tools use to simulate regression formula using 
R-studio. For further explanation to the process flow, follow below sub topic in 
Chapter 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. 
 
Train Accident and incident 
 
1. Do the Investigation 
2. Do the counter measure 
     - Fix a broken area  
     - upgrading system precaution 
     - set for special prevention activities 
 
3. Problem 
     - cost limitation 
     - there is no precise priority level to reducing cases 
Prediction model assessment 
 
Cause of accident 
- finding the most contributory factor of accident 
occurrences 
- create priority factor level for each factor 
influence 
-creating prediction model for monitoring system 
of railway accident and incident 
Future planning 
 
 
1. To maintain monitoring risk level of accident or incident 
2. To reduce accident cases   
- Plan for special program / system upgrade as 
prevention activities base on priority level getting 
from prediction model 
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